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I published an interview of Leo Breiman in Statistical Science [Olshen
(2001)], and also the solution to a problem concerning almost sure conver-
gence of binary tree-structured estimators in regression [Olshen (2007)]. The
former summarized much of my thinking about Leo up to five years before
his death. I discussed the latter with Leo and dedicated that paper to his
memory. Therefore, this note is on other topics. In preparing it I am re-
minded how much I miss this man of so many talents and interests. I miss
him not because I always agreed with him, but instead because his com-
ments about statistics in particular and life in general always elicited my
substantial reflection.
Technical comments here are in part my responses to Leo’s 2001 paper in
Statistical Science [Breiman (2001)]. The paper is interesting and provoca-
tive, but it demonstrates an attitude that seemed somewhat unfortunate
in 2001 when it was published and remained so in 2005 when Leo died. It
is even less fortunate today. D. R. Cox may have stated the obvious when
he noted in his discussion [Breiman (2001), page 216] that, “Like all good
caricatures, it contains enough truth and exposes enough weaknesses to be
thought-provoking.”
In his discussion of the paper, Bradley Efron states (page 219) that, “Pre-
diction is certainly an interesting subject. Leo’s paper overstates both its role
and our profession’s lack of interest in it. . . the whole point of science is to
open up black boxes, understand their insides, and build better boxes for
the purposes of mankind. . . we can hope that the present paper was written
more as an advocacy device than as the confessions of a born-again black
boxist.”
For years I have preferred Cox’s approach [Breiman (2001), page 216].
“Professor Breiman takes data as his starting point. I would prefer to start
with an issue, a question or a scientific hypothesis.” Also, I believe strongly
that crisp mathematical formulations of statistical problems can clarify rather
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than obscure them; likely, if pressed Leo would have agreed. The paper and
Bruce Hoadley’s discussion of it focus on the importance of predictors. A
predictor might be “important” if it predicts whatever outcome is in ques-
tion accurately by itself. Alternatively, it might be called “important” if
the performance of other predictors is harmed by its absence. More gener-
ally, a variable might be deemed important if it is approximately mutually
predictable with a set of predictors, and the entire set is important or not
by either criterion. These notions permit easy expression in mathematical
terms, though space precludes precise statements here. Both the paper and
much discussion of it are about selecting predictive features, in particular
about tracking the behavior of features as time, age, or some other dimension
varies. This may amount to choosing a parsimonious set of basis functions
for a linear space of functions that describes the sample paths of that fea-
ture. Coefficients of the feature in the carefully selected basis then become
features themselves in whatever classification or prediction is required. See,
for example, Sutherland et al. (1988), Chapter 10.
Suppose that an “outcome” y might be predicted from input x, and that
the mechanism by which the outcome is determined involves not only the in-
put x, but also noise. The conditional distribution of y given x, fθ(y|x) might
depend also on unknown parameters; denote them by theta (θ). There are,
then, three obvious sources of randomness. Leo argues—I think correctly—
that the principal issue facing the scientist who might make inferences from
data is to predict some future y* drawn from the distribution described by f ,
but not necessarily to make statements about f itself. Leo scoffed, probably
unfairly, at the substantial energy spent by members of the statistical com-
munity quantifying information about θ available from data. He was slightly
unfair when he spoke derisively (page 204) of “Bayesian methods combined
with Markov chain Monte Carlo.” The strict, frequentist approach to infer-
ence has as sources of randomness the noise, and x itself. Only in “random
effects” models, though conventional for a Bayesian, does the distinction be-
come blurred; see Hill (1965). The frequentist does not impute randomness
to θ; for that person it is a leap to impute randomness of any origin, subjec-
tive or frequentistic, to it. I am surprised at the pejorative lumping together
of the different approaches to inference about (f,x, θ), ignoring, as it were,
upon what inference is conditioned. More or less, frequentistic inference is
conditioned on θ and Bayesian on x. Though Leo’s paper was published
nearly 10 years ago, he speaks (Section 11.3, page 213) of microarray data,
which hardly permit analyses without at least an implicit Bayesian/random
effects model for the distribution of p-values in rows of a large rectangular
array. For careful discussion of how Bayesian formulations, empirical Bayes
solutions, and predictions regarding future data combine to yield much of
interest regarding expression arrays and brain imaging, to cite two areas of
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application, see Efron’s papers on local false discovery rates (locfdr), avail-
able through http://stat.stanford.edu/~ckirby/brad/papers/.
Section 11.1 and following of Leo’s obviously provocative 2001 paper is
about survival analysis. His acknowledgments (page 215) make explicit men-
tion of his and my discussion of the celebrated Cox model in particular and
of biostatistics in general. In this arena I believe that Leo’s critique is right
on. For starters, survival itself, rather than the more difficult concept of haz-
ard, especially relative hazard, is of paramount interest. Predicting survival
for the next patient matters far more than does testing any hypothesis about
past patients. Leo’s various complaints about the practices and orientation
of some leading statistical journals would be difficult to report diplomatically
when it comes to testing the parameters of a particular model for survival
versus predicting survival for the next patient. His were not merely the ru-
minations of a senior professor at a famous university who may have had a
paper rejected. “Testing” parameters of a model is fraught with difficulties
that owe in part to sample size, even when the model is correct and censor-
ing is not an issue. This critique is applicable no matter the philosophical
underpinnings of scientific inference. Difficulties include but are not limited
to the celebrated “Lindley Paradox.” See, for example, Lindley (1957) and
Lehmann (1958).
I was fortunate to be able to discuss with Leo work by Piette, Nazari and
Olshen (1998). It ran afoul of the editor of a major statistical journal and,
perhaps unwisely, was never revised for submission elsewhere. What sepa-
rates this paper from many others in survival analysis is its prediction of
readmission for future substance abuse patients rather than inference about
parameters of models that describe past patients. It uses a parametric boot-
strap applied for the most part to Weibull models that are shown to fit the
data. The bootstrap was adapted to prediction in our context. To be precise,
the paper is a case study of readmission patterns following 42,648 discharges
of patients treated for substance abuse in U.S. Department of Veterans Af-
fairs hospitals for a year straddling 1990–1991. We learned that substance
abuse inpatients are at extremely high risk of readmission, particularly if
they are more than 65 years of age and have chronic medical problems.
Risk of readmission is highest immediately following discharge and declines
subsequently. We learned that intrinsic difficulties in predicting readmission
rather than limitations of our model, account for its varying accuracy.
While Leo Breiman was certainly an important statistician, probabalist,
and colleague, he was also a good friend. Leo’s notion of compromise was
clear enough to all who knew him, but it was not the modal approach. Think
of a couple, one of whom wishes to live in New York, while the other wants
Los Angeles. Though living in St. Louis might be a compromise of sorts, it
would please neither party. So it was with Leo: your way or my way, but
necessarily one of the two. If it’s not always your way or always mine, it
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might be said that the party is willing to compromise. That Leo was willing
to “compromise” was illustrated in bringing our four-author book [Breiman
et al. (1984)] to completion.
Leo and Chuck Stone had neither spoken for awhile nor did either have an
algorithm whereby the book could be completed, no matter that each author
in his own way had spent much effort furthering CART. One day Leo and
Jerry Friedman were having lunch in a restaurant on Hearst in Berkeley. Per
chance, Chuck Stone, my wife Susan Olshen, and I came to the same restau-
rant. To ignore one another would have been to be publicly rude, something
to which Leo was quite allergic. On Leo’s urging, the four coauthors agreed
to meet after lunch in his office. Susan said that she wouldn’t attend, instead
would go to a library to read a book. I said, “Nothing doing. You come to
the meeting.” As the meeting began, Leo took a chair in back of his desk,
with Jerry seated to one side. Chuck and I were to be seated facing Leo from
the far side of the desk. Deliberately, I took a chair with an elevated seat
and placed it adjacent to the desk, between Leo and Jerry on one side and
Chuck and me on the other. I asked Susan to sit in the carefully situated
chair. I guessed that the ever gallant Leo would be as accommodating in
that scenario as in any other, and I hoped that he and Chuck could agree on
whatever needed agreeing. Surely Jerry and I would go along with anything
to which Leo and Chuck agreed. Mirable dictu! Leo and Chuck came quickly
to at least superficially amicable agreement, in the Breiman style. All of us
did what we decided to do, and the book was born. The rest was downhill.
Even when dealing CART itself, occasionally Leo may not have been
sufficiently generous to prior contributions by others. He stated [Breiman
(2001), page 207] that, “While trees rate an A+ on interpretability, they
are good, but not great, predictors. Give them, say, a B on prediction.”
Of course, “boosting” and other technologies by which to enhance trees,
many discussed by Leo in his paper, were well known before 2001. The very
early reference by Morgan and Sonquist (1963) to CART-like algorithms
advertised them as, “automatic interaction detectors.” See the discussion on
pages 181 and 216 of Breiman et al. (1984). In work not reported here, others
and I have found that if splits on successive nodes of a binary decision tree
are taken to suggest two-factor interactions, while splits on individual nodes
have suggested main effects, then plugging the entire list of candidates into
“the lasso” [Tibshirani (1996)] and plugging output into most any reasonable
classifier can lead to accurate prediction. Admittedly, validating the entire
process is difficult.
In closing this remembrance I am reminded of a story told me by a former
Berkeley colleague, now sadly also deceased. It concerned appointments of
Leo and Chuck Stone to the UC Berkeley faculty. He said to the dean who
was considering the files. “Look. You know me. I’m against almost every-
thing. But I think that these would be great appointments.” Fortunately, as
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it turned out, Berkeley got this decision right and appointed two remarkable
individuals to its esteemed faculty. One of the two, Leo, has been gone now
for five years. It understates the case to say that I miss him very much!
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